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The EU’s role in the world development debate receives remarkably little academic 
attention despite the Commission’s sole responsibility for trade negotiations and the scale 
of its aid programme, where it has a shared competence. Currently the EU is a major 
player in the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations and is renegotiating its trade 
concessions with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of developing 
countries. In terms of aid, by 2005 assistance administered directly by the European 
Commission (EC) totalled €6.1 bn., making the EC the third largest aid donor after Japan 
and the US. At the UN the Millennium Review Summit in 2005 the EU committed itself 
to achieving an Official Development Assistance (ODA) target of 0.56% of Gross 
National Income by 2010, with the EC's own budget for external actions increasing by 
4.5 % per annum over the period 2007-2013. 
 The framework for EU development policy was restated in the 2005 Policy 
Statement ‘European Consensus on Development’ (EC 2005). Three ‘policies’ are 
identified – the European Neighbourhood and Partnership, Pre-accession and 
Development Cooperation - and three ‘instruments’ - humanitarian, stability and macro 
economic assistance.  Here I am going to concentrate only upon the development 
dimension. This Statement built upon the initial ‘Statement on Development Policy’ (EC 
2000) and reiterated many of its objectives and commitments, but also reflected the 
changes that had taken place in the intervening five years.  In particular it placed an 
emphasis upon the Millennium Development Goal and made a qualified commitment to
prioritising assistance to low-income developing countries (LICs). The EC had been 
subject to considerable criticism for its failure to direct a greater percentage of its aid 
programmes to the LICs. In 2000 EC ODA to the LICs had fallen to only 32% of the 
total, reflecting the EU's focus upon the ‘near-abroad’ of the Mediterranean and 
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Central/Eastern Europe. By 2005 the share of the LIC had risen to 46% of EC aid. 
Administratively it reaffirmed a shift from project aid to general budgetary support to the 
developing countries and to performance-based assessment. Conditionality was to be 
expressed in a ‘contract’ with the partner countries, recognising that aid effectiveness can 
only be achieved through ‘national ownership’ of aid  programmes by the developing 
country. 
 The EC administered aid programme is composed of two parts – the external 
actions element of the general budget and the European Development Funds (EDF). The 
Member States contributions to the latter are separate from those to the general budget of 
the EU despite the Fund being administered by the Commission. The five year EDFs are 
the mechanism for providing the aid dimension of the Partnership Conventions with the 
ACP group of developing countries. These Conventions (Yaoundé, Lomé and currently 
Cotonou) have their origins in the colonial relations of the Member States and now 
covers 79 developing countries. The Conventions have both an aid and trade dimension 
and placed an emphasis upon continuous political dialogue with a supporting institutional 
framework – a unique feature in such international agreements. The administrative 
innovations in aid delivery under the EDFs have set the pattern for the EC’s approach to 
its relations with the non-ACP developing states under, for example, the Mediterranean 
Barcelona process or in individual Association Agreements. After the organisational 
reforms of 2000 (EC 2000) DG Development is responsible for aid policy and 
programming for the ACP states, while DG Relex covers all other developing countries. 
EuropeAid is responsible for the implementation of these aid programmes. By 2005 of 
the €6 bn. of aid payments, €2.5 bn (41%) was under the EDF to the ACPs, 18% to 
Mediterranean countries, 10% to Asia and 5% to Latin America, with similar shares to 
the Balkans and the Central/Eastern Europe. 
 Dissatisfaction with the results of the EU’s aid programme and the changing 
international climate at the end of the cold war led to a major review of the existing Lomé 
Conventions. The new Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in 2000, will run for 20 
years, double the length of all previous Conventions (for details see Salama and Dearden 
2002). A total of €25 bn. has been made available for the period 2000-2007, EDF 9 
providing €13.5 bn. and the European Investment Bank (EIB) €1.7 bn., and will increase 
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to €22.6 bn. under EDF10 for the years 2003-13. One of the major changes under 
Cotonou has been the radical simplification of aid instruments.  These are now provided 
under two ‘envelopes’ – grants (€11.3 bn.) and a loan Investment Facility (€2.2 bn.) 
administered by the EIB. A particular emphasis has now been placed upon the role of the 
private sector in economic development, hence the creation of the substantial Investment 
Facility. Grants will continue to be allocated under national and regional Indicative 
Programmes, based upon the preparation of Country Support Strategies, but the EC will 
continue to shift its emphasis from funding individual projects to more general sectoral 
and budget support. For this to succeed a much closer political dialogue will be required 
between the EC and the governments of the recipient countries. Cotonou continues the 
process begun under Lomé IV where the funds allocated to an ACP are subject to a 
process of rolling review, assessed both for need and performance.  This assessment will 
increasingly fall upon the local Delegations under the process of decentralisation begun 
in 2000 with the administrative reforms. 
 The political dialogue with individual ACPs has inevitably become more intense 
as the EU has placed increasing emphasis upon human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law.  Under Cotonou these are regarded as ‘essential elements’ whose infringement may 
lead to the imposition of sanctions including the suspension of aid.  In addition Cotonou 
includes reference to ‘good governance’, which after opposition from the ACPs was 
included as a separate ‘fundamental element’. Although the sanction procedure is slightly 
different, failures in the case of good governance can still result in the suspension of the 
EC’s aid programme.  To overcome the problems of failing ACP governments Cotonou 
also placed an emphasis upon the potential role of non-state actors. This includes local 
government, trade unions, farmers’ organisations, local NGOs and the private sector.  To 
support their role in fostering good governance and in service delivery the EC allocated 
substantial funds to building their capacity.  Institution building, gender and environment 
considerations were all identified in Cotonou as ‘cross-cutting’ issues to be addressed 
across all of the EC's development initiatives. 
 Cotonou also included a significant change in the trade concessions that were to 
be offered to the ACPs. Under all previous Conventions the ACPs were granted non-
reciprocal tariff-free access to the EU market for their manufactured exports and for most 
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of their primary commodities, with the principal exception of a number of CAP products; 
specific arrangements existed for bananas, run, beef and sugar under the Commodity 
Protocols.  After a successful challenge to its banana regime before the WTO the EU 
required that the Cotonou Agreement be WTO compatible through adopting the principle 
of reciprocity.  While the WTO allows non-reciprocal trade concessions to be offered to 
low income developing countries the ACP group includes a number of middle income 
developing countries who would not qualify for such concessions.  Although the EU has 
obtained a waiver from the WTO this will expire in 2008, by which time the EU is 
expecting the ACPs to have successfully negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA)(see ODI June 2006). These are being negotiated in regional groupings of the 
ACPs and the intension is that these new agreements will be phased in over a twelve year 
period.  Although the EU committed itself to ensuring that the ACP’s position would not 
be eroded by the move to EPAs this is proving hard to reconcile with its objective of 
achieving WTO compatibility.  
 The negotiations are proving difficult with serious doubts as to whether they will 
be concluded by the end of 2007, the EC’s intended deadline (for details of the current 
state of negotiations see ‘Trade Negotiations Insights’ on www.acp-eu-trade.org ). 
Problems have arisen with some of the regional groupings that are undertaking the 
negotiations, especially in Southern Africa where there are existing customs unions. A 
further difficulty arises from the EU’s “Everthing-But-Arms” (EBA) initiative which 
offers non-reciprocal tariff-free access for all 48 low-income developing countries. For 
the low-income ACPs the EPA will therefore offer little in the way of trade preferences. 
For all of the ACPs the reductions in tariffs under the successive rounds of the WTO, and 
its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has gradually 
eroded the significance of the EU’s tariff concessions and reduced the value of any 
further tariff preferences available under an EPA. For the ACPs the requirement to open 
up their markets to EU exports represents a considerable challenge. From the perspective 
of the EU the opening up of their markets is driven by a belief that this will make a major 
contribution to their economic development rather than offering a significant market 
opportunity for EU exporters. In most cases the ACPs remain insignificant trading 
partners for the EU beyond a few commodity producers such as Nigeria for oil. Only 
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South Africa is a major exporter of manufactured goods to the EU and it is currently not 
eligible for non-reciprocal trade preferences. Integration of the ACP states into the world 
economy has always remained one of the stated objectives of EU development policy and 
opening up their markets to international competition is regarded as offering a major 
contribution to their development.  
 The negotiations are becoming dominated by a number of detailed issues. Phasing 
is likely to prove the least contentious, with the ACPs expected to only be required to 
reduce their tariffs towards the end of the transition period. The ‘rules of origin’, which 
define whether goods will qualify for duty free entry and reflect the local value-added of 
the product, are a more problematic technical issue (see ODI November 2006). There 
also remain disagreements over the extent of the EPAs, in particular whether they should 
extend beyond trade in goods to include the trade in services, investment protection, 
competition policy, public procurement etc. These are often referred to as the ‘Singapore 
issues’ in the context of the currently stalled Doha Round of the WTO. The WTO 
negotiations and those for the EPA remain interrelated. The WTO provides the legal 
framework for the EPA and issues such as the requirement that reciprocity must cover 
‘substantially all trade’ is an important area for interpretation. For the EU this has been 
defined as requiring tariff free access for 80% of trade. Changes in the approach to the 
developing countries would inevitably have changed the compatibility requirements in an 
EPA. The WTO negotiations, intended as a ‘development round’, were expected to pay 
particular attention to the needs of the developing countries through ‘special and 
differential treatment’. Indeed the Doha Round negotiations are in many ways more 
significant for the ACPs than the EPA. The opening up of the EU market to their primary 
products, currently restricted in many cases under the CAP, offers some ACPs significant 
export potential. However not all ACPs would be beneficiaries as the Commodity 
Protocols offered a relative preference over other  non-EU suppliers at EU guaranteed 
prices. However the future of the Commodity Protocols has been on question for some 
time, with only the Sugar Protocol of any significance and this is currently under review. 
Of more significance has been the undertaking of the EU to phase out its agricultural 
export subsidies, although the failure of both the EU and US to commit to reducing their 
domestic agricultural subsidies is the principal cause of the current impasse.  
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 Any EPA, as well as being likely to require significant economic structural 
adjustment in most ACPs in the face of EU competition, will also erode their tax base, 
given their financial dependence upon customs duties. The ACPs have therefore 
attempted to link any EPA to additional EU aid. This the EU has strongly resisted, 
asserting that the allocations under EDF10 have already been decided. However the EU 
has shown its willingness to discuss ‘Trade Related Assistance’ (TRA) to support the 
adoption of an EPA. In 2005 the EU’s Council agreed that the Member States would 
strive to collectively increase their TRA to €1 bn. per annum by 2010 which, combined 
with the EC’s own allocation, would take TRA to €2 bn. per annum. 
 Attention has also turned to the alternatives that the EU might offer to the ACPs 
in the case of the failure of the EPA negotiations. The alternative developing countries 
trade preference regime is that of the General System of Preferences (GSP). This EU 
variant of a global concession scheme has proved highly discriminatory over its lifetime, 
trade concessions being withdrawn from countries and products that have been 
particularly successful in penetrating the EU market. Indeed the scheme included a 
‘graduation mechanism’ excluding specific country products depending upon the 
country’s level of industrialisation and ‘export specialisation’. The current GSP covers 
7,200 products from 179 countries with the major beneficiaries being India, China and 
Brazil. But, in addition a ‘GSP-plus’ has been offered to ‘dependent and vulnerable’ 
countries. This is of particular interest to the ACPs since this is the most likely alternative 
trade regime to the EPA for those not qualifying for the EBA. To qualify for GSP-plus 
countries must ratify 23 international Conventions covering such areas as human rights 
and labour standards and be particularly export dependent. So far only 15 countries have 
qualified for GSP-plus. 
 In the WTO negotiations the EU’s position is heavily influenced by its domestic 
agricultural lobby and hence is very much related to the issue of CAP reform. It must also 
be recognised that in the EPA negotiations in particular areas, for example fisheries, the 
EU is pursuing its own economic interests. Nonetheless both at the WTO and in the EPA 
negotiations there is a genuinely held view that the reciprocal opening up of developing 
country markets will make a significant contribution to their economic development.  The 
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reduction of tariff protection and their integration into the world economy is seen is a 
driver of the essential structural change necessary for sustained economic growth.    
 Aside from the issues of broad policy attention also needs to be paid to the 
administrative and organisational performance of the EC. ‘Policy evaporation’, the gap 
between official policy rhetoric and the reality of delivery, can only be understood within 
the context of the evolving approach to the EC’s organisation and administration. This 
has been subject to considerable change over the last decade (see Dearden 2006), from 
the creation of EuropeAid to the adoption of a common framework for country 
assessment and programming through the adoption of Country Strategy Papers (CSP). A 
number of issues remain unresolved or the outcomes of reform uncertain.   
‘Deconcentration’, combined with the move to general budget support, will place a 
significant additional burden upon local Delegations and will require them to extend their 
role beyond ‘auditing’ to that of policy analysis. Their relationship to Brussels in this 
process remains uncertain – e.g. how far they will have local discretion in their approach 
or their influence upon formulating broad Brussels policy through ‘feedback’. At the 
same time the evolution of an EU ‘diplomatic service’ under the recently proposed 
‘Treaty Amendments’ may provide the necessary enhancement of their role in the 
developing world for these changes to be successful.  
 Some elements of the EC’s approach to aid administration are simply constrained 
by the lack of an established robust methodology. Thus problems have continued to be 
faced in integrating the cross-cutting issues – gender equality, environment, children’s 
and indigenous peoples’ rights and HIV/AIDS - into aid programming. Similarly 
enhancing the poverty focus of EC aid policy requires not just a reallocation of resources 
between countries but also adequate poverty impact assessments of individual 
programmes. This is by no means an easy process to undertake. Similarly enhancing the 
role of the non-state actors presents challenges in implementation as great, if not greater, 
than working through established governments, no matter how poor their performance. 
Ensuring that small local organisations are representative, effective and free of corruption 
will present a major resource-intensive challenge. 
 Considerable attention has also been paid to what has become known as the 3 Cs 
– Coordination, Complementarity and Cohesion (for details on 3 Cs see www.three-
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cs.net). Ensuring the coordination and complementarity of aid programmes is essential 
for ensuring their effectiveness. Duplication of programme planning and 
reporting/monitoring has also placed a substantial burden on the administrations of many 
developing countries, countries whose public administrations are already recognised as 
weak. The EC, before its recent reforms, had even recruited local technical assistants in 
competition with local governments. Coordinating country aid programmes requires not 
only intra-EU coordination between the EC’s and the bi-lateral country programmes of 
the Member States, but between all donors. This has been recognised internationally as 
reflected in the recent Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005). Within the EU the 
Action Plan (COM(2006)87) offers a number of elements that will contribute to greater 
coordination and complementarity. These extend from the establishment of databases on 
aid and procedural requirements, to harmonisation ‘roadmaps’ and participation in joint 
OECD/DAC monitoring. Similarly the EC is proposing extending its common CSP 
framework for adoption by all Member States and moving towards Joint Multi-annual 
Programming across EC and bi-lateral aid programmes, with joint disbursement and 
monitoring. In terms of coordination the EC recognises the need for focus and 
specialisation. It is proposing a framework for co-financing, with either the EC or 
specific Member States taking the lead in particular countries.  
 One of the criticisms of the EC’s aid programme has been its lack of focus. In 
response the original Development Policy Statement had proposed that the EC 
concentrate upon eight areas in which it was regarded as having a comparative advantage 
– aid related to trade and development, regional integration, macro-economic support, 
transport, rural development, health, education and institution building. Unfortunately the 
2005 Policy Statement further extended this list to include water and energy provision, 
and ‘social cohesion and development’. 
 Coordination also has a wider dimension which offers the EC a potentially unique 
role in contributing to aid effectiveness through the adoption of elements of the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) (Dearden 2005). The needs of administrative 
harmonisation and innovations in joint funding are already delivering elements of the 
OMC. The EC has already been mandated to undertake annual reporting on the Member 
States implementation of their pledges on aid targets and to propose corrective measures 
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where progress is regarded as insufficient.  This process may lead to “opportunities for 
collective benchmarking” (EC 2004), one of the most significant components of the 
OMC, opening the door as it does to peer review. In a broader sense this process can 
contribute to aid effectiveness through the diffusion of best practice in bilateral 
programmes, as a result of the exchange of information between the Member States, and 
foster policy convergence through the enhanced dialogue between individual 
governments. 
 Policy coherence requires that the EU be consistent across its various polices 
ensuring, for example, that its trade policies are compatible with its development policy 
objectives.  Trade is a particular pertinent example since the EU has sole competence, but 
other areas of EU policy will clearly interact with development policy. Indeed this raises 
one of the most significant questions for political scientists and development studies 
academics, the relationship between development policy and other ‘foreign policy’ 
objectives, as reflected for example in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Are the 
instruments of development policy to be regarded merely as one tool amongst many in 
the pursuit of the EU’s wider external objectives or are they ‘ring-fenced’ in the 
realisation of the EU’s commitments to international development? These contrasting 
views are reflected in the debate as to the current organisational structure. The existence 
of a separate DG Development, responsible only for ACP relations, appears inconsistent 
with the responsibility of DG Relex for all other developing countries. The approach of 
DG Relex is far more likely to subsume development policy to wider external relations 
considerations then DG Development.  
 The increasing emphasis upon issues such as migration control in the political 
dialogue with the ACP states and with countries in the ’near-abroad’ is seen as a 
reflection of these wider considerations. The consistency and transparency with which the 
EC assesses ‘needs’ and ‘performance’ or applies sanctions in the case of breaches of the 
fundamental or essential elements of Cotonou may also offer some interesting insights 
into the nature of EU development policy. For some commentators the abolition of the 
Development Council of Ministers and its absorption into the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council reflects the EU’s relative priorities. Meanwhile the debate 
about the ‘budgetisation’ of the EDF i.e. its amalgamation into the general budget of the 
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EU, favoured by the EC and some member governments, has raised objections from the 
ACPs who fear the loss of these ‘ring-fenced’ development funds. 
 Indeed it is naive not to view development policy in its broader context and to 
distinguish between the significant European NGO lobby’s objectives and the reality of 
EU development policy formulation in its wider external relations perspective. 
Considerations of economic interest and security are no less significant in the 
understanding of the EU's trade and aid relations with the developing world than in any 
other external relations. 
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